Tobias Chavez v. Dole Food Company Inc by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-2-2016 
Tobias Chavez v. Dole Food Company Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Tobias Chavez v. Dole Food Company Inc" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 859. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/859 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 13-4144  
_______________ 
 
TOBIAS BERMUDEZ CHAVEZ, et al., 
v. 
DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC., et al. 
 
(D. Del. No. 1-12-cv-00697) 
 
 
JULIO ABREGO ABREGO, et al., 
v. 
DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC., et al. 
 
(D. Del. No. 1-12-cv-00698) 
 
 
ALVARADO ALFARO MIGUEL FRANCISCO, et al., 
v. 
DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC., et al. 
 
(D. Del. No. 1-12-cv-00699) 
 
 
2 
 
JORGE LUIS AGUILAR MORA, et al., 
v. 
DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC., et al. 
 
(D. Del. No. 1-12-cv-00700) 
 
 
EDWIN AGUERO JIMENEZ, et al., 
v. 
DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC., et al. 
 
(D. Del. No. 1-12-cv-00701) 
 
 
GONZALEZ ARAYA FRANKLIN, et al., 
v. 
DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC., et al. 
 
(D. Del. No. 1-12-cv-00702) 
 
 
TOBIAS BERMUDEZ CHAVEZ, et al., 
 
 Appellants 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
(Civil Nos. 1-12-cv-00697, 1-12-cv-00698, 1-12-cv-00699, 
1-12-cv-00700, 1-12-cv-00701, and 1-12-cv-00702) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
_______________ 
 
3 
 
Argued on June 24, 2014 before Merits Panel 
Court Ordered Rehearing En Banc on September 22, 2015 
Argued En Banc on February 17, 2016 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, FUENTES*, 
SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., 
VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and  
RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  September 2, 2016) 
 
 
Scott M. Hendler  
Hendler Lyons Flores  
1301 West 25th Street, Suite 400  
Austin, TX  78705 
 
Jonathan S. Massey  [ARGUED] 
Massey & Gail LLP 
1325 G Street, N.W., Suite 500  
Washington, DC  20005  
 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
                                                 
* The Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed Senior Status on 
July 18, 2016. 
4 
 
Caitlin J. Halligan 
Andrea E. Neuman  [ARGUED] 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP  
200 Park Avenue, 47th Floor  
New York, NY  10166  
 
William E. Thomson, III 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP  
333 South Grand Avenue 
47th Floor  
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
 
Somers S. Price, Jr.  
Potter, Anderson & Corroon LLP 
1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor 
Wilmington, DE  19801  
 
 Counsel for Appellees Dole Food Company, Inc., Dole 
 Fresh Fruit, Standard Fruit Company, Standard Fruit 
 and Steamship Company 
 
Michael L. Brem 
Schirrmeister Diaz-Arrastia Brem, LLP  
700 Milam Street, 10th Floor  
Houston, TX  77002  
 
Donald E. Reid  
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP 
1201 North Market Street, P.O. Box 1347 
Wilmington, DE  19899 
 
 Counsel for Appellee Dow Chemical Co. 
 
5 
 
Timothy J. Houseal 
Jennifer M. Kinkus  
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP 
1000 North King Street 
Rodney Square  
Wilmington, DE  19801  
 
D. Ferguson McNiel, III  
Vinson & Elkins LLP 
1001 Fannin Street, Suite 2500 
Houston, TX  77002 
 
 Counsel for Appellee Occidental Chemical Corp. 
 
John C. Phillips, Jr. 
Phillips, Goldman, McLaughlin & Hall, P.A. 
1200 North Broom Street  
Wilmington, DE  19806 
 
 Counsel for Appellee AMVAC Chemical Corporation 
 
Kelly E. Farnan  
Katharine L. Mowery 
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. 
920 North King Street  
One Rodney Square  
Wilmington, DE 19801 
 
 Counsel for Appellee Shell Oil Co. 
 
6 
 
Steven L. Caponi  [ARGUED] 
Blank Rome LLP 
1201 Market Street, Suite 800  
Wilmington, DE  19801  
 
R. Jack Reynolds 
Samuel E. Stubbs  
Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw & Pittman LLP 
909 Fannin Street, Suite 2000 
Two Houston Center  
Houston, TX  77010 
 
 Counsel for Appellees Chiquita Brands International, 
 Inc., Chiquita Brands, L.L.C., Chiquita Fresh North 
 America, L.L.C. 
 
Boaz S. Morag 
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP 
One Liberty Plaza  
New York, NY  10006  
 
James W. Semple  
Cooch & Taylor 
1000 West Street, 10th Floor 
Wilmington, DE  19801 
 
 Counsel for Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
7 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, with whom McKEE, Chief Judge, 
AMBRO, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, 
JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and RESTREPO, 
Circuit Judges, join.  
 The plaintiffs in these cases are foreign agricultural 
workers who labored on banana plantations in Central and 
South America from the 1960s through the 1980s.  They 
allege that their employers and certain chemical companies 
knowingly exposed them to toxic pesticides over many years, 
and that this exposure caused adverse health consequences 
ranging from sterility, to birth defects, to a heightened risk of 
cancer.  Litigation against the defendants first began in Texas 
state court in 1993, yet to date no court has reached the merits 
of the plaintiffs’ claims.  
 A series of byzantine procedural developments 
eventually led the plaintiffs out of Texas and into Louisiana, 
where they filed several diversity-based suits in federal 
district court raising tort claims against the defendants under 
Louisiana law.  The defendants moved to dismiss those 
claims on timeliness grounds, and the plaintiffs, fearing that 
the Louisiana District Court would grant those motions, filed 
nearly identical suits in the District of Delaware raising 
analogous tort claims under Delaware law.  Because the 
timeliness rules of Louisiana and Delaware are different, the 
plaintiffs hoped that, even if the Louisiana District Court 
concluded that their claims were time-barred under Louisiana 
law, the Delaware District Court would reach the opposite 
conclusion under Delaware law.  These developments 
eventually gave rise to three procedural questions we now 
confront in this appeal.   
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 Our initial inquiry concerns proper application of “the 
first-filed rule.”  That rule is a comity-based doctrine stating 
that, when duplicative lawsuits are filed successively in two 
different federal courts, the court where the action was filed 
first has priority.  In some cases, “first-filed” courts have 
relied on the rule to enjoin litigation in other jurisdictions.  In 
other cases, “second-filed” courts have cited the rule to defer 
consideration of a matter until proceedings have concluded 
elsewhere.  Application of the rule is discretionary.1  If a 
second-filed court decides to invoke the rule, it also has the 
discretion to decide whether to stay, transfer, or dismiss the 
case before it.  Here, the Delaware District Court chose to 
apply the first-filed rule and then, rather than staying or 
transferring the plaintiffs’ claims, it dismissed those claims 
with prejudice.2  That decision effectively terminated the 
plaintiffs’ cases.  On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that these 
dismissals were an abuse of discretion.   
 The second issue relates to personal jurisdiction.  One 
of the defendants, Chiquita Brands International, moved for 
dismissal on the ground that the Delaware District Court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over it.  The plaintiffs argued that 
personal jurisdiction was present, but, in the event that the 
                                                 
1 See E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 972 
(3d Cir. 1988), aff’d on other grounds, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) 
(“[W]e review [a] district court’s order [under the first-filed 
rule] for abuse of discretion.”).   
2 “The label ‘with prejudice’ attached to the dismissal of a 
claim signifies that the dismissal is an adjudication of the 
merits and hence a bar to further litigation of the claim.”  
Korvettes, Inc. v. Brous, 617 F.2d 1021, 1024 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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Delaware District Court disagreed, they asked it to transfer 
their claims against Chiquita Brands International to New 
Jersey, where that defendant is incorporated, rather than 
dismiss them outright.  The Delaware District Court held that 
it lacked personal jurisdiction and refused to transfer the 
claims, believing that its decision to dismiss all other 
defendants under the first-filed rule merited a similar 
dismissal as to Chiquita Brands International.  The plaintiffs 
contest that ruling on appeal. 
 Our third inquiry relates to the doctrine of res judicata.  
While the defendants’ motions to dismiss under the first-filed 
rule were pending in Delaware, the Louisiana District Court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on timeliness grounds.  
Certain defendants in the Delaware suits, reacting to this 
development, moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Delaware 
claims on the ground that the Louisiana dismissals ought to 
bar re-litigation of related claims in another forum.  The 
Delaware District Court declined to reach the issue in view of 
its application of the first-filed rule, but the issue nonetheless 
confronts our Court today given the present posture of these 
cases. 
 Our resolution of this appeal is therefore threefold.  
First, we conclude that the Delaware District Court abused its 
discretion under the first-filed rule by dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.  Second, we conclude that 
the Delaware District Court erred by refusing to transfer the 
plaintiffs’ claims against Chiquita Brands International to 
another forum.  And third, we conclude that the timeliness 
dismissals entered by the Louisiana District Court do not 
create a res judicata bar to the plaintiffs’ Delaware suits.  As 
these cases come to us today, there is a serious possibility that 
10 
 
no court will ever reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.  
More than twenty years after this litigation began, we think 
that outcome is untenable—both as a matter of basic fairness 
and pursuant to the legal principles that govern this 
procedurally complex appeal.3 
Accordingly, we will vacate the Delaware District 
Court’s dismissals and remand these cases for further 
proceedings. 
I. Background 
 These cases arise from the use of the pesticide 
dibromochloropropane (DBCP) on banana farms in several 
countries, including Panama, Ecuador, and Costa Rica.  The 
plaintiffs allege that they were exposed to DBCP beginning in 
the 1960s and ending sometime in the 1980s, and that their 
exposure to DBCP has caused them to suffer from a number 
of serious health problems.  The plaintiffs have been seeking 
redress for those injuries in various courts around the country 
and, indeed, around the world for over twenty years.   
                                                 
3 By emphasizing the procedural complexity of this case, we 
do not mean to suggest that the defendants have acted 
improperly or unethically by seeking to defeat the plaintiffs’ 
claims solely on procedural grounds.  Within reasonable 
boundaries, the defendants are free to pursue their interests in 
the courtroom in whatever manner they deem appropriate. 
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 The full history of these cases has been well chronicled 
elsewhere, and we will not duplicate those efforts here.4  Still, 
because the complexity of this litigation’s procedural history 
bears on our substantive analysis, we provide a brief 
summary of that history below. 
A. Procedural History in the Texas Courts 
 This litigation began in 1993 with the filing of a class 
action in Texas state court.5  The defendants quickly adopted 
a three-step strategy for defeating the plaintiffs’ claims.  First, 
they impleaded various foreign entities under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act.6  This, in turn, provided a hook 
for federal jurisdiction.7  Second, the defendants removed the 
case to the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas.  Third, the defendants asked the Texas 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Blanco v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., No. N11C-07-
149 (JOH), 2012 WL 3194412, at *1–5 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 8, 2012) (providing a very thorough recital of this 
litigation’s many twists and turns). 
5 In reality, multiple groups of plaintiffs filed competing 
lawsuits, leading to months of inter-court wrangling and 
eventual consolidation in the Texas courts.  We elide these 
and similar details for the sake of brevity.   
6 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1603. 
7 The United States Supreme Court later rejected the 
defendants’ view of what kinds of foreign companies the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act permits a defendant to 
implead.  See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 
476–77 (2003). 
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District Court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ class action on the 
ground of forum non conveniens.8   
 This strategy was successful, at least for a time.  In 
1995, the Texas District Court granted the defendants’ 
request for a forum non conveniens dismissal, thereby 
sending the plaintiffs back to their home countries to try to 
litigate their claims there.9  It also denied all other pending 
motions as moot, including the plaintiffs’ pending motion for 
class certification.10  Even so, the Texas District Court stated 
                                                 
8 The doctrine of forum non conveniens embodies the 
principle that, “[a]lthough a plaintiff’s choice of forum should 
rarely be disturbed, ‘[w]hen an alternative forum has 
jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in the plaintiff’s 
chosen forum would establish . . . oppressiveness and 
vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s 
convenience, or when the chosen forum [is] inappropriate 
because of considerations affecting the court’s own 
administrative and legal problems, the court may, in the 
exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case.’”  Kisano 
Trade & Invest Ltd. v. Lemster, 737 F.3d 869, 873 
(3d Cir. 2013) (all alterations in original except first) (second 
set of internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Windt v. 
Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 189 
(3d Cir. 2008)). 
9 See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1373 
(S.D. Tex. 1995). 
10 See id. at 1375. 
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that the plaintiffs could return to federal court if their home 
countries refused to take jurisdiction over their claims.11     
 By the early-2000s, it had become clear that foreign 
courts were, as the Texas District Court anticipated, unwilling 
to hear these cases.  As a result, the plaintiffs returned to 
Texas and asked for permission to litigate their claims in the 
United States.  The Texas District Court, acting under the 
return jurisdiction clause it included in its 1995 dismissal 
order, revived the case and sent it back to Texas state court.12  
                                                 
11 See id. (“[I]n the event that the highest court of any 
foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction of any action commenced by a plaintiff in these 
actions in his home country or the country in which he was 
injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon 
proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the 
action as if the case had never been dismissed . . . .”).   
12 See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 798, 
816−17 (S.D. Tex. 2004).  In fact, the procedural questions 
that arose upon the plaintiffs’ return to the United States were 
more complicated still.  Because of the intervening effect of 
the Supreme Court’s Patrickson decision, supra note 7, the 
Texas District Court concluded that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to decide any motion to reinstate the plaintiffs’ 
cases in federal court.  Id. at 813–15.  It therefore remanded 
those cases (which had previously been consolidated) to the 
Texas state courts with instructions for those courts to decide 
the reinstatement question.  Id. at 816–17.  Note that this 
entire morass was created by the defendants’ twin decisions 
to invoke the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and seek a 
forum non conveniens dismissal in the first instance. 
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The defendants challenged the reinstatement but were 
unsuccessful.13  In 2009, they again removed the case to 
federal court, this time claiming that Congress’s passage of 
the Class Action Fairness Act in 2005 conferred federal 
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state-law claims, even though 
the plaintiffs sued the defendants well over a decade before 
the Act came into effect.  The Texas District Court rejected 
this argument and—again—remanded the case to state 
court.14   
There, the defendants obtained a denial of class 
certification in 2010.15  That decision brought the Texas-
based chapter of this saga to a close. 
B. Subsequent Litigation in Louisiana and 
Delaware  
 After the denial of class certification in Texas, the 
plaintiffs in these cases decided to strike out on their own and 
sue the defendants on a non-class basis.  They determined 
                                                 
13 See In re Standard Fruit Co., No. 14-05-00697-CV, 2005 
WL 2230246 (Tex. App. 14th Dist. Sept. 13, 2005) (denying 
defendants’ petitions for a writ of mandamus challenging the 
reinstatement). 
14 See App. Vol. II at 208–13 (a copy of the slip opinion in 
Carcamo v. Shell Oil Co., No. 09-cv-258 (KMH) (S.D. Tex. 
Dec. 18, 2009), remanding the case to state court).  
15 See id. at 214 (a copy of the order in Carcamo v. Shell Oil 
Co., No. 93-C-2290 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Brazoria Cty. June 3, 
2010), denying the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification). 
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that it made sense to sue in either Louisiana or Delaware,16 
but, given the long pedigree of this litigation, there were 
potential timeliness problems in both jurisdictions. 
 Those problems were twofold.  First, there was the 
issue of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling.17  The 
plaintiffs’ claims flow from state-law causes of action with 
relatively short limitations periods.  The plaintiffs maintain 
that this is not a barrier to suit because the pendency of their 
class action in Texas should have tolled any applicable 
limitations period between 1993, when the putative class 
action was filed, and 2010, when the Texas state court denied 
class certification.  At the time the plaintiffs were deciding 
whether to sue in Louisiana or Delaware, however, it was 
unclear whether the courts in those states would agree.18 
                                                 
16 See Pls.’ Br. at 11–12 (explaining that “Standard Fruit 
was based in Louisiana and United Fruit (now Chiquita) 
maintained corporate operations there,” while “Delaware is 
the chosen State of incorporation of numerous of the 
defendants, including Dow, Shell, Chiquita and Dole”).   
17 In many instances, courts have concluded that the filing of 
a class action complaint stops the statute of limitations clock 
(that is, “tolls” it) with respect to unnamed members of the 
class.  By using the phrase “cross-jurisdictional class action 
tolling,” we mean to describe the question of “whether a state 
court would engage in [such] tolling during the pendency of a 
class action in another court.”  Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 
F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 1999). 
18 In the federal system, “the Supreme Court [has] held that 
where class certification has been denied because of the 
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 Second, even if Louisiana or Delaware were to 
recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, the 
plaintiffs’ claims might still be untimely.  Recall that the 
plaintiffs’ class action was filed in Texas state court, removed 
to the Texas District Court, dismissed on the ground of forum 
non conveniens, and then reinstated several years later.  If a 
court were to conclude that the plaintiffs’ class action was not 
“pending” during the period of the forum non conveniens 
dismissal, the plaintiffs’ claims would likely be untimely even 
if cross-jurisdictional class action tolling applied.19  
                                                                                                             
 
failure to demonstrate that the class was sufficiently 
numerous, ‘the commencement of the original class suit tolls 
the running of the statute [of limitations] for all purported 
members of the class who make timely motions to intervene 
after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action 
status.’”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 299 
(3d Cir. 2010), as amended (Oct. 20, 2010) (second alteration 
in original) (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 
U.S. 538, 553 (1974)).    
The Supreme Court “later extended its holding in American 
Pipe to ‘all asserted members of the class, not just as to 
interveners.’”  Id. (quoting Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. 
Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983)).  States, however, are free 
to recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling or to 
reject it.   
19 Indeed, this issue has arisen with respect to the Delaware 
statute of limitations in a related case.  See infra at pages 
65−68. 
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 Deciding where to file suit therefore required the 
plaintiffs to predict how courts in Delaware and Louisiana 
would, in the absence of clear precedent, untangle the 
procedural Gordian Knot that this litigation had become.  The 
plaintiffs eventually decided to sue in federal district court in 
Louisiana.  The defendants then moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-
barred under Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations.20 
 Fearing that an adverse timeliness ruling might be 
forthcoming from the Louisiana District Court, the plaintiffs 
decided to take action in order to preserve their ability to 
litigate in another forum where their claims might be timely.21  
To that end, they filed several suits in the Delaware District 
Court that raised analogous state-law causes of action against 
the same defendants as in Louisiana.  The plaintiffs alerted 
the Louisiana District Court to their actions in Delaware,22 
and indeed told the Louisiana District Court that if it were to 
hold that their claims were timely, they would continue to 
                                                 
20 See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492. 
21 As the plaintiffs tell it, they first began to doubt their 
decision to sue in Louisiana when, about ten months after 
litigation began there, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted 
writs to review two cases directly raising the issue of cross-
jurisdictional class action tolling.  See Pls.’ Br. at 13–14. 
22 See App. Vol. II at 216–17 (Ltr. from Pls.’ Counsel to 
Judge Barbier (June 4, 2012)).  
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litigate in Louisiana rather than pursue their claims 
elsewhere.23   
 The defendants believed that this strategy—filing 
duplicative lawsuits in Delaware as an insurance policy 
against an adverse timeliness ruling in Louisiana—was 
improper.  Accordingly, Dole filed a motion to dismiss the 
Delaware cases under the first-filed rule.24  The Delaware 
District Court concluded that the first-filed rule applied, 
meaning that it then faced a discretionary decision whether to 
stay, transfer, or dismiss the proceedings.25  It chose to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against Dole with prejudice, 
reasoning that the plaintiffs had already sued in Louisiana and 
“one fair bite at the apple [was] sufficient.”26  The Delaware 
                                                 
23 Id. at 216 (“If the La. Supreme Court rules that the 
Plaintiffs [sic] cases are not Prescribed, the Plaintiffs would 
elect to proceed in Louisiana . . . .”).  Louisiana law refers to 
statutes of limitations as “prescriptive periods,” and an action 
is “prescribed” when the limitations clock has expired.  See, 
e.g., Bouterie v. Crane, 616 So. 2d 657, 660 (La. 1993) 
(explaining that “a prescriptive period is a time limitation on 
the exercise of a right of action”).  
24 See id. at 45, ECF No. 3.  The motion was filed by Dole 
Food Co., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., and 
Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. 
25 Chavez v. Dole Food Co., No. 12-cv-697 (RGA), 2012 
WL 3600307, at *1–2 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2012). 
26 Id. at *2.  See also Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 947 
F. Supp. 2d 438, 440–41 (D. Del. 2013) (denying plaintiffs’ 
motion for a stay and for reconsideration). 
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District Court eventually applied this reasoning to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ claims against most of the other defendants as 
well.27 
 One additional defendant, Chiquita Brands 
International, moved for dismissal on the ground that the 
Delaware District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it.  
The plaintiffs contested that motion, but, in the event that the 
Delaware District Court concluded that personal jurisdiction 
was lacking, they asked it to transfer their claims against 
Chiquita Brands International to New Jersey, where that 
defendant is incorporated, instead of dismissing their claims 
outright.  The Delaware District Court, having already 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ duplicative lawsuits merited 
dismissal under the first-filed rule, refused that request and 
granted the motion to dismiss.28   
 In the meantime, things started to go badly for the 
plaintiffs in Louisiana.  First, the Louisiana District Court 
                                                 
27 The day after the Delaware District Court dismissed the 
Dole defendants, Occidental Chemical Co. moved for 
dismissal based on the first-filed rule.  (App. Vol. II at 48, 
ECF No. 24.)  Other defendants, including Del Monte Fresh 
Produce N.A., Inc., Dow Chemical Co., and Shell Oil Co. 
later joined the motion, which the Delaware District Court 
granted on March 29, 2013.  (App. Vol. I at 8–9.)  Although 
final judgment had been entered in the Louisiana District 
Court, the Delaware District Court reasoned that the first-filed 
rule still applied because the propriety of the Louisiana 
dismissals had been appealed to the Fifth Circuit.  
28 Chavez, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 444. 
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dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred.  It reasoned 
that, even if the Louisiana Supreme Court were to recognize 
cross-jurisdictional class action tolling (which, to date, it had 
not done), the Texas District Court’s forum non conveniens 
dismissal in 1995 ended any tolling period and restarted the 
clock under Louisiana’s statute of limitations.29  Shortly after 
the Louisiana District Court issued its ruling, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held in an unrelated case, Quinn v. Louisiana 
Citizens Property Insurance Corp.,30 that Louisiana does not 
recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling at all.31  
That holding, of course, had the effect of rendering the 
plaintiffs’ claims untimely in Louisiana regardless of how one 
views the effect of the 1995 forum non conveniens 
                                                 
29 See Chaverri v. Dole Food Co., 896 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 
(E.D. La. 2012) (“Per Louisiana law, the entrance of the final 
judgment [on forum non conveniens grounds] absolutely 
stopped the pendency of the case and restarted prescription.”).  
The Louisiana District Court also ruled that, independent of 
the dismissal order, the Texas District Court’s “denial of the 
motion for class certification as moot” also restarted 
Louisiana’s statute of limitations clock.  Id. at 568–69. 
30 118 So. 3d 1011 (La. 2012). 
31 Id. at 1022 (“[O]ur analysis . . . leads us to conclude that 
the [Louisiana] legislature has rejected ‘cross-jurisdictional 
tolling’ in class action proceedings.”).     
21 
 
dismissal.32  The Fifth Circuit recognized this and affirmed 
the Louisiana District Court’s dismissal orders on that basis.33    
 Quite apart from the first-filed rule, the Louisiana 
District Court’s timeliness dismissals also raised potential res 
judicata issues vis-à-vis the Delaware litigation.  Two of the 
defendants—Chiquita Brands, L.L.C. and Chiquita Fresh 
North America, L.L.C.—recognized this and moved for 
dismissal both under the first-filed rule and on res judicata 
grounds.34  In view of its prior holdings, the Delaware District 
Court dismissed the cases against these two defendants under 
the first-filed rule and dismissed their res judicata motions as 
                                                 
32 The Delaware Supreme Court, by contrast, has since 
reached the opposite conclusion, holding in a related case that 
Delaware does, in fact, recognize cross-jurisdictional class 
action tolling.  See Dow Chem. Corp. v. Blanco, 67 A.3d 392, 
399 (Del. 2013). 
33 See Chaverri v. Dole Food Co., 546 F. App’x 409, 414 
(5th Cir. 2013) (“Quinn makes it clear that class actions filed 
in other states no longer interrupt prescription and gives no 
support to an argument that such suits ever would have done 
so.”). 
34 App. Vol. II at 50, ECF No. 41.  Chiquita Brands 
International, Inc. joined in these motions, but only in the 
event that the Delaware District Court denied its motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
22 
 
moot.35  These orders terminated the last of the plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
 All of this procedural history brings us, at last, to the 
fundamental issue in this case:  whether the Delaware District 
Court’s prejudice-based dismissals were a proper exercise of 
its discretion under the first-filed rule.  Once the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the Louisiana District Court’s timeliness rulings, the 
dismissals in Delaware threatened to prevent the plaintiffs 
from ever being able to litigate the merits of their claims in 
any court.  Believing that this result was not a permissible 
outcome under the first-filed rule, the plaintiffs appealed.36  A 
divided panel of our Court affirmed the Delaware District 
Court’s dismissals, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing 
en banc, and we granted that petition in September of 2015.37   
 We now turn to the proper application of the first-filed 
rule in the present case. 
                                                 
35 Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc., No. 12-cv-697 (RGA), 
2013 WL 5288165, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2013).   
36 The Delaware District Court exercised jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
37 See Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 796 F.3d 261 
(3d Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated 
(Sept. 22, 2015).  Judge Fuentes dissented from the original 
panel decision.  See id. at 271–81. 
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II. The Delaware District Court Abused Its Discretion 
under the First-Filed Rule  
 We initially adopted the first-filed rule in Crosley 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp.38  That case, like all first-filed cases, 
involved two duplicative actions.  In the first, Crosley sued 
Hazeltine in federal district court in Delaware to contest the 
validity of several of Hazeltine’s patents.  In the second, 
Hazeltine sued Crosley in federal district court in Ohio, 
alleging that Crosley had infringed several of the same 
patents at issue in Delaware.  Crosley asked the Delaware 
District Court to enjoin the Ohio suits, but it refused.  We 
reversed with instructions to enter a temporary injunction.39  
In doing so, we stated that “[t]he party who first brings a 
controversy into a court of competent jurisdiction for 
adjudication should, so far as our dual system permits, be free 
from the vexation of subsequent litigation over the same 
subject matter.”40 
 In E.E.O.C. v. University of Pennsylvania,41 we 
elaborated on Crosley and discussed various scenarios where, 
for equitable reasons, the presumption against duplicative 
litigation might not apply.  That case arose from an E.E.O.C. 
investigation into the University of Pennsylvania’s decision 
to deny tenure to a professor, allegedly based on the 
professor’s race and sex.  The E.E.O.C. subpoenaed the 
                                                 
38 122 F.2d 925, 929–30 (3d Cir. 1941). 
39 Id. at 930. 
40 Id.  
41 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988).   
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professor’s tenure file, and the University resisted turning 
over the relevant documents.  Knowing that a subpoena 
enforcement suit was imminent, the University preemptively 
sued the E.E.O.C. in federal district court in the District of 
Columbia.  That suit, a declaratory judgment action, sought to 
challenge the E.E.O.C.’s policies governing how it 
investigated denials of tenure.  The E.E.O.C. nonetheless 
filed its subpoena enforcement action in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, raising the question of whether the first-filed 
rule barred the Pennsylvania suit.42 
 We concluded that it did not.  We reiterated that the 
first-filed rule is “grounded on equitable principles”43 and 
requires district court judges to “fashion[] a flexible response 
to the issue of concurrent jurisdiction.”44  In our view, the 
district court was correct to focus on the fact that “[t]he 
timing of the University’s filing in the District of Columbia 
indicate[d] an attempt to preempt an imminent subpoena 
enforcement [action].”45  We concluded that, “[b]ecause the 
first-filed rule is based on principles of comity and equity, it 
should not apply when at least one of the filing party’s 
motives is to circumvent local law.”46 
                                                 
42 See id. at 972–73. 
43 Id. at 977. 
44 Id. (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 978.  
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 Both Crosley and E.E.O.C. addressed the issue of 
when a federal district court, confronted with a second-filed 
action, should permit that action to continue.  This appeal 
raises a different question.  When a district court decides to 
apply the first-filed rule, it then faces the discretionary choice 
whether to stay the second-filed action, transfer it, dismiss it 
without prejudice, or dismiss it with prejudice, thereby 
permanently terminating the case.  The Delaware District 
Court chose the last option.  The issue we confront now is 
whether that decision was an abuse of the Delaware District 
Court’s discretion—a question of first impression in our 
Circuit.  
 We begin by looking to the relevant treatises.  
Speaking of the first-filed rule as a doctrine of abstention, 
Wright and Miller say that “it is well settled that if the same 
issues are presented in an action pending in another federal 
court, one of these courts may stay the action before it or even 
in some circumstances enjoin going forward in the other 
federal court.”47  Wright and Miller also discuss the 
possibility of transferring a second-filed case to another 
                                                 
47 17A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. 
Cooper & Vikram David Amar, Federal Practice and 
Procedure:  Jurisdiction § 4247, at 433–38 (3d ed. 2007). 
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forum.48  At no point do they suggest that a court ought to 
dismiss a second-filed action, much less do so with prejudice.   
 Moore’s Federal Practice, meanwhile, states that “[i]f 
the first-filed action is vulnerable to dismissal on 
jurisdictional or statute of limitations grounds, the court in the 
second-filed action should stay it or transfer it, rather than 
outright dismiss it.”49  This guidance reflects the 
commonsense proposition that, in a case raising timeliness 
concerns, a court’s decision to dismiss a second-filed suit 
could, if the limitations clock were to expire in the first 
forum, have the effect of putting the plaintiffs entirely out of 
court.  Indeed, that is precisely what is threatened in this very 
case.   
 Several of our sister circuits have also considered the 
appropriateness of dismissing a case under the first-filed rule.  
The Seventh, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits have all stated that 
district courts should be careful to apply their discretion 
under the rule so as not to cause undue prejudice to the 
litigants appearing before them.  These courts have therefore 
                                                 
48 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. 
Cooper & Richard D. Freer, Federal Practice and Procedure:  
Jurisdiction § 3854 & n.12, at 339–43 (4th ed. 2013) 
(collecting cases).  While some of the cases collected by 
Wright and Miller involve dismissals under the first-filed 
rule, at no point do Wright and Miller suggest that such 
dismissals are advisable or even appropriate. 
49 17 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 111.13[1][o][ii][A] (3d ed. 
updated through 2016). 
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indicated that, in most circumstances, a stay or transfer of a 
second-filed action will be more appropriate than a dismissal. 
 We begin with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Asset 
Allocation and Management Co. v. Western Employers 
Insurance Co.50  The plaintiff there sued the defendant in 
federal district court in Illinois, only to have the defendant 
then sue the plaintiff in federal district court in California.  At 
the plaintiff’s request, the Illinois District Court not only 
enjoined any duplicative litigation in California, but ordered 
the defendant to dismiss its California case entirely.51   
 While the Seventh Circuit affirmed the portion of the 
district court’s order enjoining the parties from proceeding in 
California, it reversed the dismissal order.  It explained that if 
the Illinois District Court were to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
claims before litigation was “well advanced,” the parties were 
free to litigate their claims in California.52  The court also 
warned that statute of limitations problems could arise if the 
defendant in Illinois were forced to dismiss its California 
claims.  It summarized its view this way:  “[W]hy take 
chances?  It is simpler just to stay the second suit.”53 
 The Seventh Circuit again considered the first-filed 
rule in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas 
                                                 
50 892 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1989). 
51 Id. at 568.   
52 Id. at 571. 
53 Id.  
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Pension Fund v. Paramount Liquor Co.54  That case arose 
from a contested arbitration, at the conclusion of which one 
party filed suit to enforce the arbitration award in Missouri 
and another party filed suit to annul the award in Illinois.  
Because the Missouri suit was filed first, the district court in 
Illinois dismissed the case before it—without prejudice—
under the first-filed rule.55  The Seventh Circuit concluded 
that the district court erred by doing so, stating that the 
dismissal “created an unwarranted risk of legal prejudice.”56  
The better rule, the court explained, is that “[w]hen comity 
among tribunals justifies giving priority to a particular suit, 
the other action (or actions) should be stayed, rather than 
dismissed, unless it is absolutely clear that dismissal cannot 
adversely affect any litigant’s interests.”57  
 The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar approach in 
Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc.58  That case arose 
from Uniweld’s attempt to seek cancellation of several of 
                                                 
54 203 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 2000). 
55 See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. 
Paramount Liquor Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1095–96 
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (dismissing the action without prejudice). 
56 Paramount Liquor Co., 203 F.3d at 445.   
57 Id. at 444; see also Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that that “[e]ven when prudence calls 
for putting a redundant suit on hold, it must be stayed rather 
than dismissed unless there is no possibility of prejudice to 
the plaintiff”).   
58 946 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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Alltrade’s federal trademark registrations before the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  Neither side was 
satisfied with the outcome of that proceeding, leading 
Uniweld to file suit in Florida and Alltrade to file suit in 
California.  The California court, applying the first-filed rule, 
dismissed the case before it.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
vacated that decision.  Looking to the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Asset Allocation for guidance, it expressed the 
concern that if the Florida court were to terminate Uniweld’s 
first-filed case without reaching the merits, Alltrade “would 
have to file a new suit in California and would risk 
encountering statute of limitations problems.”59  A stay, on 
the other hand, would avoid any prejudice to the parties.  If 
the litigation were to proceed in Florida, “the stay [in 
California] could be lifted and the second-filed action 
dismissed or transferred.”60 
 Finally, the Fifth Circuit considered the proper 
application of the first-filed rule in Burger v. American 
Marine Officers Union.61  The plaintiff there sued the same 
defendants twice, first in Florida and then again in Louisiana.  
The Louisiana District Court dismissed the case—with 
prejudice—under the first-filed rule.62  The Fifth Circuit 
                                                 
59 Id. at 629. 
60 Id. (quoting W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 
24, 751 F.2d 721, 729 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
61 No. 97-31099, 1999 WL 46962 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1999) 
(unpublished per curiam opinion). 
62 See Burger v. Am. Mar. Officers Union, No. 97-cv-2085 
(GTP), 1997 WL 599301, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 1997). 
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vacated that decision.  It noted that, after the Louisiana court 
had dismissed the case, the Florida court dismissed several of 
the defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The 
Louisiana court’s prejudice-based dismissal thereby created a 
situation in which the plaintiff was barred from litigating the 
merits of his claims in another forum where personal 
jurisdiction might be present.  The Fifth Circuit explained that 
“[w]hen the jurisdiction of the first-filed court to hear the 
dispute is uncertain, it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss the 
claims in the second-filed court with prejudice, as it creates 
the risk that the merits of the claims could never be 
addressed.”63  Instead, the Louisiana court “should have 
either granted a stay or dismissed the claims . . . without 
prejudice.”64  
 The through-line connecting these cases is the 
proposition that a court exercising its discretion under the 
first-filed rule should be careful not to cause unanticipated 
prejudice to the litigants before it.  We agree with that 
proposition and today incorporate it into the jurisprudence of 
our Circuit.  
 In addition to reflecting the wisdom of our sister 
circuits, this conclusion is consistent with, and perhaps even a 
necessary consequence of, our obligations under Article III.  
The “mandate . . . [to] hear cases within [our] statutory 
jurisdiction is a bedrock principle of our judiciary.”65  In 
                                                 
63 Burger, 1999 WL 46962, at *2. 
64 Id. at *3. 
65 In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 439 
(3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring). 
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Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,66 the Supreme Court 
considered how this mandate intersects with various 
abstention doctrines.  It began by reiterating that “federal 
courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is 
conferred upon them by Congress.”67  It is true, the Court 
explained, that “a federal court has the authority to decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction when it ‘is asked to employ its 
historic powers as a court of equity.’”68  Even so, the Court 
went on to underscore the fact that, in suits for damages “at 
law,” its precedents generally only “permit a federal court to 
enter a stay order that postpones adjudication of the dispute, 
not to dismiss the federal suit altogether.”69   
 Quackenbush thus drew a distinction between two of 
the Supreme Court’s abstention precedents, Louisiana Power 
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux70 and County of Allegheny 
v. Frank Mashuda Co.71  In Thibodaux, the plaintiff’s claims 
arose under a Louisiana statute that, up to that point, had not 
yet been interpreted by the Louisiana courts.  The district 
court stayed the federal proceedings “until the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana ha[d] been afforded an opportunity to interpret 
                                                 
66 517 U.S. 706 (1996). 
67 Id. at 716.   
68 Id. at 717 (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, 
Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
concurring)).  
69 Id. at 719 (emphasis omitted).   
70 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
71 360 U.S. 185 (1959). 
32 
 
[the law].’”72  The Thibodaux Court concluded that this 
decision was appropriate in view of the federal interest in 
“avoiding the hazards of serious disruption by federal courts 
of state government or needless friction between state and 
federal authorities.”73  In County of Allegheny, by contrast, 
the district court in Pennsylvania “had not merely stayed 
adjudication of the federal action pending the resolution of an 
issue in state court, but rather had dismissed the federal action 
altogether.”74  Our Court vacated the dismissal on appeal, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed.75  Quackenbush explained that 
the divergent outcomes in these cases flowed from the 
distinction between dismissing an action and merely staying 
it.76  As Quackenbush put it, “[u]nlike the outright dismissal 
or remand of a federal suit . . . an order merely staying the 
action ‘does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty.’”77 
 For present purposes, the teaching of Quackenbush is 
that “where there is no other forum” with the power to hear a 
case, “relinquishing jurisdiction is not abstention; it’s 
abdication.”78  In other words, judge-made canons of comity 
                                                 
72 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 26. 
73 Id. at 28.   
74 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721.   
75 Cty. of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 198. 
76 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721.  
77 Id. (quoting Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29). 
78 One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d at 440 (Krause, J., 
concurring). 
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and equity cannot supplant a district court’s duty to decide 
cases within its jurisdiction.  Consistent with this principle, a 
district court should generally avoid terminating a claim 
under the first-filed rule that has not been, and may not be, 
heard by another court.    
 Our own abstention jurisprudence has long directed 
district courts to stay, rather than dismiss, potentially 
duplicative federal suits.79  As we explained in Feige v. 
Sechrest,80 a stay “retains the sensitivity for concerns of 
federalism and comity implicated by . . . abstention, while 
preserving appellants’ right to litigate their claims in the 
federal forum should the [state] courts, for jurisdictional or 
other reasons, fail to adjudicate them.”81  In this way, a stay 
order does not “abdicate [a district court’s] judicial duty to 
exercise its jurisdiction,” but rather “postpone[s] the exercise 
of that jurisdiction until [related] proceedings . . . reach their 
conclusion.”82   
                                                 
79 See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callison, 844 F.2d 
133, 138 (3d Cir. 1988) (“In the unusual circumstances of this 
case, where federal policy counsels deferral to a state 
proceeding which is not strictly parallel, some matters 
arguably will remain for resolution after the state proceedings 
are concluded.  Therefore, we think the better practice here is 
to stay the federal action rather than dismissing it.”). 
80 90 F.3d 846 (3d Cir. 1996). 
81 Id. at 851.  
82 Id.  
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 The benefits of staying a second-filed suit are just as 
persuasive in the context of the first-filed rule.  Because a 
stay confines litigants to the first forum until proceedings 
there have concluded, a stay will generally avoid wasted 
judicial efforts, conflicting judgments, and unnecessary 
friction between courts.  In addition, a second-filed court will 
rarely need to reach the merits of the stayed case.  The far 
more likely result is that the matter will reach a final 
resolution in the first court.  In the few instances where there 
is no res judicata (or other) bar that would prevent litigation 
in the second forum, it will generally be because the second 
suit is not truly duplicative of the first.  In those 
circumstances, a second-filed court has an obligation, 
consistent with Quackenbush, to take jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs’ claims. 
 We therefore conclude that, in the vast majority of 
cases, a court exercising its discretion under the first-filed 
rule should stay or transfer a second-filed suit.  Even a 
dismissal without prejudice may create unanticipated 
problems.  A dismissal with prejudice will almost always be 
an abuse of discretion.   
 Note that we say “almost always,” not “always.”  The 
factual circumstances giving rise to duplicative litigation are 
too variable to adopt a blanket, hard-and-fast rule, and there 
may well be circumstances in which a district court is correct 
to respond to a second-filed suit with a prejudice-based 
dismissal.  For example, “if the second suit is harassing, 
vexatious, [or] an abuse of process, the proper 
disposition . . . is dismissal with prejudice, so that the plaintiff 
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cannot refile the suit.”83  Similarly, if the duplicative litigation 
results from the plaintiff’s own failure to follow the rules, 
such as by repeatedly failing to timely serve process, a 
prejudice-based dismissal may be appropriate.84  Blatant 
forum shopping or gamesmanship by one or both parties may 
also merit such a result.85  
 This, of course, brings us to the issue at the heart of the 
present litigation.  The defendants insist that what happened 
here was forum shopping.  In their view, the plaintiffs had an 
obligation to research the timeliness rules in both Louisiana 
and Delaware and then, having done so, take their “best shot” 
at finding a forum willing to hear the merits of their claims.  
If the plaintiffs chose poorly, and their claims were dismissed 
as time-barred, that result might be unfortunate—but, the 
defendants insist, such a possibility does not require federal 
courts to entertain duplicative lawsuits.   
                                                 
83 Asset Allocation, 892 F.2d at 571 (punctuation modified).   
84 See, e.g., Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 
224 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that dismissing a second-filed suit 
with prejudice may be appropriate when such a dismissal is 
“entirely a consequence of the plaintiff’s own failure to 
follow the rules”). 
85 Alternatively, some courts have reacted to gamesmanship 
by refusing to apply the first-filed rule at all.  See, e.g., CBS 
Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Inc., 
259 F.R.D. 398, 409 (D. Minn. 2009) (“Given the likely 
forum-shopping by both CBS Interactive and Defendants, the 
Court declines to rigidly apply the first-filed rule . . . .”). 
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 To be sure, there is some merit to the defendants’ 
assertions.  A plaintiff who sues in two jurisdictions 
simultaneously may be required to litigate in the first forum 
once the court there has expended substantial judicial 
resources.86  A plaintiff’s negligence in researching the 
applicable timeliness rules may also have adverse 
consequences.  If it is crystal clear that, under the limitations 
period in one forum, a plaintiff’s claims will be untimely, and 
it is crystal clear that, under the limitations period in a second 
forum, a plaintiff’s claims will be timely, it may well be the 
case that a plaintiff who erroneously sues in the first forum 
will have to live with the consequences of the inevitable 
dismissal.  But that outcome, should it come to pass, will be a 
function of the first forum’s substantive law of res judicata 
and claim preclusion.  Whether and to what extent those 
principles apply is a separate question from the proper 
application of the first-filed rule.  To put it another way, the 
first-filed rule is just one of many doctrines that cabin 
                                                 
86 For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only 
permit a plaintiff to dismiss a suit voluntarily, without court 
approval, “before the opposing party serves either an answer 
or a motion for summary judgment,” or by stipulation of all 
parties.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A).  Principles of estoppel 
may also limit a plaintiff’s choices.  The plaintiffs here, for 
example, told the Louisiana District Court that they filed the 
Delaware cases only to preserve their right to litigate there in 
the event of an adverse timeliness ruling.  If the Louisiana 
District Court had concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims were 
in fact timely, the plaintiffs arguably would have been 
estopped from litigating anywhere else. 
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duplicative litigation.  It does not need to do all of the work 
on its own.  
 Moreover, we are skeptical of the defendants’ 
characterization of the facts giving rise to the present appeal.  
The assertion that the plaintiffs engaged in impermissible 
forum shopping depends on the proposition that the plaintiffs 
acted improperly by trying to preserve their right to litigate in 
two different jurisdictions.  In view of the unusual 
circumstances surrounding these cases, we simply disagree.   
 While reasonable minds may differ about what 
constitutes forum shopping in any particular case, the term 
generally denotes some attempt to gain an unfair or unmerited 
advantage in the litigation process.  But here, the plaintiffs 
were indifferent as to which court would hear their claims; 
they simply wanted a court to hear their claims.  Indeed, the 
traditional rule is that a timeliness dismissal in one 
jurisdiction does not bar litigation of the same claim in 
another forum with a longer limitations period.87  Nor were 
                                                 
87 Wright and Miller characterize the traditional rule as 
stating that “dismissal on limitations grounds merely bars the 
remedy in the first system of courts, and leaves a second 
system of courts free to grant a remedy that is not barred by 
its own limitations rules.”  18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur 
R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure:  Jurisdiction § 4441, at 224 (2d ed. 2002).  
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments says that a 
timeliness dismissal generally “operates as a bar in the 
jurisdiction in which it is rendered” but “does not preclude an 
action in another jurisdiction if that jurisdiction would apply a 
statute of limitations that has not yet run.”  Restatement 
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the plaintiffs negligent in failing to research the applicable 
timeliness rules in Louisiana and Delaware.  The law was 
simply unclear.  Once the Texas state court denied the 
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in 2010—nearly two 
decades after this litigation began—the plaintiffs could only 
guess whether other jurisdictions would recognize cross-
jurisdictional class action tolling and conclude that their 
claims were timely.  Louisiana and Delaware addressed that 
issue only after the plaintiffs filed suit in Louisiana—and 
even then reached divergent conclusions.88 
 Whatever else the first-filed rule demands, it does not 
require litigants to see through a glass darkly in order to 
predict whether a court will consider their claims timely.  In 
our view, the defendants have not pointed to a single 
advantage, “either legally, practically, or tactically,” that the 
                                                                                                             
 
(Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. f & Reporter’s Note to cmt. 
f (1982). 
88 Compare Blanco, 67 A.3d at 397 (stating that the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in American Pipe “is equally 
sound regardless of whether the original class action is 
brought in the same or in a different jurisdiction as the later 
individual action”), with Quinn, 118 So. 3d at 1022 (“We 
believe the rationale of the courts rejecting ‘cross-
jurisdictional tolling’ is the one most consistent with our 
interpretation of the provisions of Louisiana’s tolling statute . 
. . .”). 
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plaintiffs sought by suing in two different jurisdictions.89  The 
plaintiffs were not trying to game the system by filing 
duplicative lawsuits.  They were trying to find one court, and 
only one court, willing to hear the merits of their case. 
 Accordingly, we hold that the Delaware District Court 
abused its discretion under the first-filed rule by dismissing 
these cases with prejudice. 
III. Personal Jurisdiction over Chiquita Brands 
International   
 This brings us to the second issue in this appeal.  The 
Delaware District Court concluded that it lacked personal 
jurisdiction over one of the defendants, Chiquita Brands 
International, and granted its motion to dismiss.  The 
plaintiffs appeal that decision.90  While the Delaware District 
Court did not err by holding that personal jurisdiction was 
wanting, we conclude that it did err by dismissing Chiquita 
Brands International from this litigation altogether.  Instead, 
                                                 
89 Young v. Cuddington, 470 F. Supp. 935, 938 (M.D. Pa. 
1979) (in the absence of evidence of forum shopping, 
transferring a plaintiff’s case, which would have been time-
barred in Pennsylvania, to a district court in a state with a 
longer statute of limitations).   
90 We review the Delaware District Court’s dismissal for 
lack of personal jurisdiction de novo, Eurofins Pharma U.S. 
Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma S.A., 623 F.3d 147, 155 
(3d Cir. 2010), and we review its decision denying the 
plaintiffs’ request to conduct jurisdictional discovery for 
abuse of discretion, id. at 157. 
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the Delaware District Court had a statutory obligation to 
transfer the claims against that defendant to another district 
court where personal jurisdiction would be present.   
 Personal jurisdiction over a defendant may be either 
general or specific.91  A court exercises general jurisdiction 
over a defendant when the plaintiff’s claim arises out of that 
defendant’s “continuous and systematic” contacts with the 
forum state.92  Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, is present 
“when the cause of action arises from the defendant’s forum 
related activities.”93  The plaintiffs do not assert that the 
Delaware District Court had specific jurisdiction over 
Chiquita Brands International, limiting our analysis to the 
question of general jurisdiction alone.  
 The Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of 
general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman.94  There, the 
Supreme Court explained that general jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation typically arises only when that 
corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so continuous 
and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the 
                                                 
91 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 
U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984). 
92 Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. 
Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Helicopteros, 
466 U.S. at 414 n.9, 416; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985)). 
93 Id. at 151 (quoting N. Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Nat. Gas 
Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
94 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
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forum State.”95  Daimler also explained that a corporation is 
generally “at home” in its “place of incorporation and 
principal place of business.”96  Applying these principles, one 
of our sister circuits has commented that it is “incredibly 
difficult to establish general jurisdiction [over a corporation] 
in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal 
place of business.”97 
 Against this backdrop, Chiquita Brands International 
argues that it was never “at home” in Delaware, and we agree.  
The company is not incorporated there, does not maintain an 
office there, and does not supervise its business there.  While 
the plaintiffs recognize as much, they contend that Chiquita 
Brands International engaged in other contacts with Delaware 
sufficient to create general jurisdiction there.  On the record 
before us, we discern no error in the Delaware District 
Court’s conclusion to the contrary.     
 But that is not the end of the matter.  Chiquita Brands 
International is incorporated in New Jersey, and the plaintiffs 
asked the Delaware District Court to transfer their claims 
against Chiquita to the New Jersey District Court if it 
concluded that personal jurisdiction was lacking.  The 
Delaware District Court refused.  Following the plaintiffs’ 
                                                 
95 Id. at 761 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 
(2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96 Id. at 760 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
97 Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 
(5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). 
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lead, it focused on the federal statute governing transfer of 
venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which states that if a district 
court concludes that a plaintiff has sued “in the wrong 
division or district,” the district court “shall dismiss, or if it be 
in the interest of justice, transfer [the] case to any district or 
division in which it could have been brought.”98  The 
Delaware District Court concluded that “[t]he policies behind 
the first-filed rule mean that transferring the case to New 
Jersey would not be in the interest of justice.”99 
 We disagree.  In the first place, the statutory provision 
applicable in these circumstances is arguably not 
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), but rather 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which 
governs transfer when there is “a want of jurisdiction.”100  In 
any event, the statutory directive is the same—namely, a 
district “shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer [the 
case] to any other such court in which the action or appeal 
could have been brought at the time it was filed.”101  Here, we 
conclude that the interest of justice requires transfer rather 
than dismissal.  The Delaware District Court’s contrary 
determination flowed solely from its mistaken application of 
the first-filed rule.  As we have explained previously, that rule 
protects comity among federal courts and prevents the 
                                                 
98 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).   
99 Chavez, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 444. 
100 See Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Moody’s Corp., 821 
F.3d 102, 114 (1st Cir. 2016) (concluding that the phrase 
“‘want of jurisdiction’ encompasses both personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction”). 
101 28 U.S.C. § 1631.  
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needless duplication of judicial efforts; it does not 
mechanistically support permanent dismissal of a plaintiff’s 
claims.    
We will therefore vacate the Delaware District Court’s 
dismissal of Chiquita Brands International and remand with 
instructions to grant the plaintiffs’ request for a transfer to the 
District of New Jersey. 
IV. The Delaware Actions Are Not Barred by 
Res Judicata  
 This brings us to the final and most doctrinally 
complex issue in this appeal—namely, whether the Louisiana 
District Court’s timeliness dismissals ought to have a claim-
preclusive effect in Delaware.  The Delaware District Court 
did not rule on this issue in light of its application of the first-
filed rule, but both sides have briefed the issue before us.102  
While we could, and perhaps normally would, remand the 
issue for consideration by the Delaware District Court in the 
first instance, there are countervailing reasons to address the 
res judicata question sooner rather than later. 
 It is true that “[w]e ordinarily decline to consider 
issues not decided by a district court, choosing instead to 
allow that court to consider them in the first instance.”103  
Still, we have made exceptions for disputes of particularly 
                                                 
102 See Pls.’ Opening Br. at 25–28; Joint Defs.’ Br. at 31–36; 
Pls.’ Reply Br. at 14–21. 
103 Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 
401 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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long “vintage,” particularly when as a “matter of judicial 
economy” it makes sense to “accelerate [a case’s] resolution 
to the extent reasonably possible.”104   
 If a case were ever in need of judicial acceleration, it is 
this one.  We see little utility in remanding the res judicata 
question when that issue raises what is, at bottom, a pure 
question of law.  We will therefore resolve the res judicata 
question now. 
A. The Inquiry under Semtek 
 The plaintiffs’ claims in Louisiana were dismissed as 
time-barred by a federal district court sitting in diversity and 
applying Louisiana law.  The question we confront is whether 
the Louisiana dismissals prevent a federal district court in 
Delaware, sitting in diversity and applying Delaware’s 
timeliness rules, from reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.   
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Semtek International 
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.105 tells us how to approach this 
question.   Semtek instructs us that the preclusive effect of a 
timeliness dismissal entered by a federal court, whether 
exercising its diversity or federal question jurisdiction, is 
always a question of federal law.106  Semtek also recognizes 
                                                 
104 R & J Holding Co. v. Redev. Auth. of Cty. of 
Montgomery, 670 F.3d 420, 429 (3d Cir. 2011).   
105 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
106 Id. at 507–08. 
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that, at common law, the traditional rule was that “expiration 
of the applicable statute of limitations merely bars the remedy 
and does not extinguish the substantive right, so that 
dismissal on that ground does not have claim-preclusive 
effect in other jurisdictions with longer, unexpired limitations 
periods.”107  Notwithstanding this traditional rule, Semtek 
held that, in a case raising issues of cross-jurisdictional claim 
preclusion resulting from a diversity court’s dismissal, 
faithfulness to Erie requires courts assessing the claim-
preclusive effect of that dismissal to look to the substantive 
law of the state where the federal diversity court sits.108  This 
means that the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal issued 
by a federal diversity court varies by jurisdiction.109 
                                                 
107 Id. at 504.  The rule’s pedigree goes back to at least 
1834, when Justice Story noted in Bank of the United 
States v. Donnally, 33 U.S. 361 (1834), that a dismissal under 
a Virginia statute of limitations would “operate as a bar to a 
subsequent suit in the same state; but not necessarily as an 
extinguishment of the contract elsewhere.”  Id. at 370.  
108 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.  Semtek characterized the goal 
of the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as aiming to prevent 
“‘substantial variations [in outcomes] between state and 
federal litigation’ which would ‘[l]ikely . . . influence the 
choice of a forum.’”  Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504 (punctuation 
modified and bracketed text in original) (quoting Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965)). 
109 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508 (“Since state, rather than federal, 
substantive law is at issue there is no need for a uniform 
federal rule.”). 
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  Semtek itself dealt with the claim-preclusive effect of 
a timeliness dismissal entered by a federal diversity court 
sitting in California.  Under the rule Semtek announced, “the 
claim-preclusive effect” of that dismissal “is governed by a 
federal rule that in turn incorporates California’s law of claim 
preclusion.”110 
 Semtek thus directs us to evaluate the res judicata 
effects of the Louisiana District Court’s timeliness dismissals 
by looking to Louisiana’s law of claim preclusion.  When we 
do so, we have little trouble concluding that Louisiana courts 
treat timeliness dismissals as judgments on the merits that 
have claim-preclusive effects.111  But that, in and of itself, 
does not decide the issue we now confront. 
 We begin by noting that there is an important 
ambiguity in Semtek itself.  Semtek alludes only briefly to the 
fact that a state might apply two rules simultaneously:  first, 
that a timeliness dismissal precludes re-litigation of the same 
claims within that state; and second, that a timeliness 
dismissal does not bar litigation of the same claims in a court 
outside that state.112  To frame the problem in the context of 
                                                 
110 Id. at 509. 
111 See, e.g., Sours v. Kneipp, 923 So. 2d 981, 984 (La. Ct. 
App. 2006) (“[A] judgment [on statute of limitations grounds] 
is not a mere interlocutory judgment deciding preliminary 
matters, but a final judgment on the merits that terminates the 
action with prejudice.”).  
112 The respondent in Semtek, Lockheed Martin Corp., 
argued that a diversity court’s timeliness dismissal is always 
claim-preclusive in other jurisdictions by operation of Federal 
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this appeal, the fact that timeliness dismissals are claim-
preclusive within Louisiana may not necessarily mean that 
such dismissals extinguish related claims in other states with 
longer limitations periods. 
 While fact patterns raising this issue are perhaps 
uncommon, they are not unheard of.  The Supreme Court of 
Connecticut, for example, addressed the issue of cross-
jurisdictional claim preclusion in Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel.113  
That case arose after a state court in Connecticut dismissed a 
suit on timeliness grounds and the plaintiffs in that action 
then commenced an arbitration proceeding in New York.  The 
defendants in the first action asked the state court to enjoin 
the arbitration proceedings as claim-precluded, which the 
                                                                                                             
 
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  The Supreme Court rejected 
that proposition.  In doing so, it looked to the provision of the 
Rules Enabling Act stating that a federal rule “shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  Semtek, 
531 U.S. at 503 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).  It reasoned 
that “if California law left petitioner free to sue on [a] claim 
in Maryland even after the California statute of limitations 
had expired, the federal court’s extinguishment of that right 
(through Rule 41(b)’s mandated claim-preclusive effect of its 
judgment) would seem to violate this limitation.”  
Id. at 503−04.  This reasoning seems to recognize that a state 
might adopt, as a principle of its own substantive law, the 
view that a timeliness dismissal in its own courts is not claim-
preclusive in other states. 
113 668 A.2d 367 (Conn. 1995). 
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state court refused to do.114   The Connecticut Supreme Court 
affirmed that decision on appeal.  It stated that while “the 
running of Connecticut’s statute of limitations precludes the 
defendants in the present action from bringing the same claim 
in Connecticut, it does not automatically bar their pursuit of 
such a claim in another jurisdiction.”115 
 The Seventh Circuit, too, noted in Reinke v. Boden116 
that states might adopt different policies about intra- and 
extra-jurisdictional claim preclusion.  The plaintiff there sued 
in Minnesota state court, lost at summary judgment on 
timeliness grounds, and then sued again in federal district 
court in Illinois.  The defendant moved for summary 
judgment in Illinois on the ground of res judicata, and the 
Illinois District Court granted the motion.  The Seventh 
Circuit reversed.  It explained that “[i]n the context of the 
intersystem use of res judicata . . . the intent of the first forum 
to save the judicial resources of the second cannot be so 
readily presumed.”117  With this distinction in mind, the 
Seventh Circuit surveyed Minnesota jurisprudence and 
concluded that Minnesota courts did not necessarily intend 
for timeliness dismissals to be claim-preclusive outside 
Minnesota.118  Other courts have cited Reinke, even post-
Semtek, to support the proposition that a state might apply res 
                                                 
114 Id. at 368–69. 
115 Id. at 371.   
116 45 F.3d 166 (7th Cir. 1995).  
117 Id. at 171.   
118 Id. at 172.  
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judicata principles differently when an allegedly duplicative 
suit is filed in another court system.119 
 Unlike the Connecticut Supreme Court, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of 
whether Louisiana timeliness dismissals are claim-preclusive 
in other jurisdictions.  The Louisiana Court of Appeal, 
however, has indicated that the dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim 
as time-barred in one court system is not necessarily claim-
preclusive in another.   
 The key case is Griffin v. BSFI Western E & P, Inc.120  
The plaintiffs there sued in Louisiana state court on a variety 
of state-law claims and then filed a second, diversity-based 
suit in federal district court in Louisiana arising from the 
same facts.121  The federal suit raised both federal question 
                                                 
119 See, e.g., Havens v. Mabus, 759 F.3d 91, 99 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (distinguishing intra-system claim 
preclusion from “determining the effect of a dismissal . . . on 
a second suit brought in a different court and, most important 
here, applying a different statute of limitations”); see also 
Joseph v. Athanasopoulos, 648 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(certifying to the New York Court of Appeals the question of 
whether a timeliness dismissal under one of that state’s civil 
practice rules “amount[s] to an adjudication ‘on the merits’ 
for res judicata purposes, such that the plaintiff cannot litigate 
her claim in another jurisdiction with a longer, unexpired 
limitations period”). 
120 812 So. 2d 726 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
121 Id. at 729.   
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claims and pendent state-law claims.  The Louisiana District 
Court dismissed certain of the plaintiffs’ federal claims on 
timeliness grounds under the applicable federal statute of 
limitations and dismissed some of the state-law claims 
without prejudice.122  The defendants then moved to dismiss 
the state suit as res judicata in light of the federal dismissals.  
The Louisiana trial court granted the motion, but the Court of 
Appeal reversed.   
 The Court of Appeal began its analysis by stating that 
“[t]he dismissal of an action under a federal statute of 
limitations constitutes a final judgment on the merits in 
federal court, and is res judicata as to successive actions 
arising from the same transaction filed in other federal 
courts.”123  Even so, the court recognized that “a claim 
dismissed under a traditional statute of limitations does not 
automatically preclude consideration of the substantive merits 
by a different or foreign court system, especially ‘in other 
jurisdictions with longer, unexpired limitations periods.’”124   
 Relying in part on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Reinke, the Griffin Court reasoned that, in a cross-
jurisdictional situation, Louisiana’s law of claim preclusion 
incorporates basic notions of equity and fairness.  
Accordingly, a court in such a situation should consider “the 
goal of res judicata principles,” including that “litigation must 
eventually have an end,” while remaining sensitive to “the 
                                                 
122 Id. at 732–33. 
123 Id. at 731. 
124 Id. at 732 (quoting Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504).   
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plaintiff’s right of access to the courts.”125  Griffin explained 
that when the Louisiana District Court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims under the federal statute of limitations, it 
had “refused to consider . . . tolling based on acts of the 
defendants,” which was “an exception recognized in 
Louisiana.”126  Consequently, the Court of Appeal concluded 
that “the federal and state time limitation rules are too 
different to foster both the goals of res judicata and the 
plaintiffs’ right to present his claim to a court.”127  In such 
circumstances, where two sovereigns would apply two 
different limitations periods, “[d]efendants may not justly 
deny plaintiffs their day in court by erecting only a procedural 
screen.”128   
 Other Louisiana cases have occasionally echoed this 
appreciation for the distinction between intra- and extra-
                                                 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 735.   
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
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jurisdictional claim preclusion.129  One way to resolve the res 
judicata question in this appeal, therefore, would be to 
conclude that even if a Louisiana timeliness dismissal bars re-
litigation of the same claims within Louisiana, it does not bar 
litigation of those claims elsewhere.    
 As it turns out, however, our resolution of these cases 
does not depend on the distinction between intra- and extra-
jurisdictional claim preclusion.  While we have wrestled with 
that distinction before,130 such an analysis raises certain deep 
                                                 
129 See Barnett v. Nichols, 824 So. 2d 485, 489 (La. Ct. App. 
2002) (concluding that the timeliness dismissal of a RICO 
claim in federal court did not bar a state-court suit arising 
from the same facts, in part because the claims were being 
litigated in “different judicial systems” and were “not subject 
to the same prescriptive periods”); Tolis v. Bd. of Supervisors 
of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 655 So. 2d 747, 
757 (La. Ct. App. 1995), vacated on procedural grounds, 660 
So. 2d 1206 (La. 1995) (Barry, J., concurring) (“[T]he res 
judicata effect of a dismissal based on prescription depends in 
part on whether the successive actions are within the same or 
different system of courts.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
130 We previously addressed the issue of extra-jurisdictional 
claim preclusion in Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 
F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 1999).  We there considered the proper 
application of New Jersey’s “entire controversy doctrine,” 
which we described as “an extremely robust claim preclusion 
device that requires adversaries to join all possible claims 
stemming from an event or series of events in one suit.”  
Id. at 135.  Conducting an extensive Erie analysis, we stated 
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that “New Jersey’s main justification for the doctrine, its 
interest in preserving its judicial resources, is minimized 
when none of the prior litigation took place in New Jersey 
state courts.”  Id. at 142.  We therefore concluded that federal 
principles of claim preclusion, not the entire controversy 
doctrine, governed the effects of a diversity dismissal in the 
New Jersey District Court, largely because “New Jersey has 
no significant interest in controlling the dockets of other court 
systems.”  Id. at 144.  
Few courts have considered whether and to what extent 
Semtek and Paramount Aviation are compatible.  At least one 
court has concluded that the two cases work hand-in-glove.  
On this view, Semtek says that, consistent with Erie, we 
assess the claim-preclusive effects of a judgment issued by a 
federal court sitting in diversity by looking to the substantive 
law of the relevant state, and Paramount Aviation tells us that 
New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine is more akin to a 
procedural rule, not a substantive one, and that, under Erie, a 
federal court need not apply it.  See Yantia N. Andre Juice 
Co. v. Kupperman, No. 05-cv-01049 (WJM), 2005 WL 
2338854, at *3 n.2 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2005) (“In Semtek, the 
Court held that federal common law governs the claim-
preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in 
diversity.  The federal common law applicable in our case, 
however, is provided by Paramount . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)).  
Our Court has addressed the issue once in a non-
precedential opinion, McHale v. Kelly, 527 F. App’x 149 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  Because the claims at issue there were precluded 
irrespective of whether we applied New Jersey or federal law, 
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questions about the structure of our federal system that are 
perhaps better left for another day.131  Instead, having 
reviewed the relevant Louisiana precedents, we are confident 
that a Louisiana court would decline to apply res judicata to 
                                                                                                             
 
we declined to decide “whether Semtek or Paramount 
Aviation controls.”  Id. at 151. 
131 For example, in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 
448 U.S. 261 (1980), a four-justice plurality of the Supreme 
Court expressed the view that, in the context of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, states lack the power to determine the 
extraterritorial effects of their own judgments.  The Court 
feared that the opposite conclusion would “risk[] the very 
kind of parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States 
that it was the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and 
other provisions of Art. IV of the Constitution to prevent.”  
Id. at 272.   
At least one scholar has therefore noted that there may be 
some tension between Thomas (states cannot dictate the 
consequences of their judgments in other jurisdictions) and 
Semtek (the exterritorial import of a timeliness dismissal 
entered by a diversity court depends on state law—including, 
perhaps, the state’s views on extraterritorial claim 
preclusion).  See Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum 
Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1027, 1052 (2002) (“Perhaps . . . the [Supreme] Court 
believes that whether a state court judgment dismissing a case 
on limitations grounds is preclusive in subsequent litigation in 
another state depends upon the rendering court’s views on a 
question it is without power to decide.”).  
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the plaintiffs’ claims even without invoking the logic of 
Griffin and similar cases.   
B. Louisiana’s Law of Res Judicata Does Not 
Bar the Plaintiffs’ Claims 
 We begin with an important foundational principle.  
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that res judicata is 
such a drastic procedural device that “any doubt concerning 
[its] application . . . must be resolved against its 
application.”132  Or, as the Fifth Circuit has put it, 
“Louisiana’s doctrine of res judicata can only be invoked if 
all essential elements are present and established beyond all 
question.”133 
   What’s more, Louisiana’s rules of claim preclusion 
are not absolute.  The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained 
that “[o]ne of the goals of res judicata is to promote judicial 
economy and fairness,” and that applying the doctrine 
“blindly or mechanically . . . does not foster judicial economy 
                                                 
132 Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210, 1215 (La. 1994).   
133 Lafreniere Park Found. v. Broussard, 221 F.3d 804, 809 
(5th Cir. 2000). 
56 
 
or fundamental fairness to the parties.”134  Courts should 
therefore not use res judicata “as a scythe applied 
mechanically to mow down claims where the party asserting 
the claim is not at fault for the lack of adjudication of that 
claim in the first suit.”135   
 At common law, Louisiana’s doctrine of res judicata 
included a safety valve for “exceptional circumstances” 
sufficient to overcome “the policies favoring preclusion of a 
second action.”136  When Louisiana adopted a new statute 
                                                 
134 Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Ref. Co., 666 
So. 2d 624, 635 (La. 1996).  While Terrebonne involved 
application of federal, not state, principles of res judicata, we 
nonetheless consider it instructive because the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has since explained that Terrebonne’s 
discussion of claim preclusion is relevant to construing 
Louisiana’s own res judicata statute.  See Oliver v. Orleans 
Par. Sch. Bd., 156 So. 3d 596, 619 (La. 2014) (“While 
Terrebonne was decided under federal law, we noted in a 
footnote that the 1991 amendment adding La. R.S. 13:4232 
‘was also enacted to include similar exceptions . . . .’” 
(quoting Terrebonne, 666 So. 2d at 632 n.4)). 
135 Terrebonne, 666 So. 2d at 635. 
136 Id. at 632 (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 26).   
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governing res judicata in 1990, it codified this exception.137  
The relevant statutory provision states that “[a] judgment 
does not bar another action by the plaintiff . . . [w]hen 
exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata 
effect of the judgment.”138  Courts considering whether to 
apply this exception “exercise [their] equitable discretion to 
balance the principle of res judicata with the interests of 
justice,” recognizing that relief is appropriate “only in truly 
exceptional cases.”139 
 Louisiana courts have held that the statutory exception 
to res judicata “generally applies to complex procedural 
situations in which litigants are deprived of the opportunity to 
present their claims due to unanticipated quirks in the 
system.”140  So, for example, the Court of Appeal applied the 
exception in Simmons v. Baumer Foods, Inc.,141 a wrongful 
death and workman’s compensation case that bounced around 
                                                 
137 Id. at 632 n.4 (explaining that res judicata is governed in 
Louisiana by La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4231, but that a 
“companion statute,” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4232, contains 
various exceptions under which the normal rules of claim 
preclusion do not apply). 
138 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4232(A)(1). 
139 Oleszkowicz v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 156 So. 3d 645, 647 
(La. 2014) (quoting 1990 cmt. to La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 13:4232). 
140 Id. at 648 (quoting Kevin Assocs., LLC v. Crawford, 917 
So. 2d 544, 549 (La. Ct. App. 2005)).   
141 55 So. 3d 789 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
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from court to court without the plaintiffs ever having had the 
opportunity to present their claims on the merits before the 
defendants invoked res judicata as a bar to relief.  In those 
circumstances, where the plaintiffs had “vigorously pursued 
their claims but the substance of [those] claims . . . [had] yet 
to be addressed,” the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
“pursuit of justice ha[d] been derailed by . . . procedural 
determinations” and an exception to res judicata was 
appropriate.142 
 Federal courts, too, have applied Louisiana’s statutory 
exception to res judicata in appropriate circumstances.  The 
Eighth Circuit, for example, relied on the exception in 
Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.143  That case arose from, of 
all things, an exploding can of hairspray.  The plaintiffs, who 
were Louisiana residents, initially sued in federal district 
court in Texas, in part because the one-year Louisiana statute 
of limitations had already run.  The Texas court transferred 
the case back to Louisiana, where the district court dismissed 
the case on timeliness grounds.  The plaintiffs then brought 
another suit in federal court in Arkansas, suing under a 
different cause of action with a longer limitations period.  
This raised the question of whether the previous dismissal in 
Louisiana created a res judicata bar vis-à-vis the Arkansas 
suit.  The Eighth Circuit concluded that it did not.  Surveying 
the cases applying Louisiana’s equitable exception to res 
judicata, it concluded that Louisiana courts were hesitant to 
invoke principles of claim preclusion when doing so would 
                                                 
142 Id. at 794.     
143 41 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1994), on reh’g on another issue, 
47 F.3d 311 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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create a “procedural windfall” for defendants,144 especially 
when “[t]he merits of the plaintiffs’ claims had not [yet] been 
reached.”145  
 The logic of Simmons and Follette applies with equal 
force to the situation we confront now.  As in Simmons, the 
plaintiffs here have “vigorously pursued their claims” only to 
be met at every moment with procedural hurdles.146  We 
believe that a Louisiana court, faced with these facts, would 
conclude that the byzantine procedural history of this case 
merits an exception to Louisiana’s normal rules of claim 
preclusion. 
 As Wright and Miller recognize, “[a]mong the weakest 
cases for preclusion would be one in which the plaintiffs were 
legitimately surprised by the limitations ruling in the first 
action; unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, there is 
nothing to be done about a limitations bar unless it is to find a 
forum with a longer period.”147  Just so.  In this case, the 
plaintiffs had no way to predict that the Louisiana Supreme 
Court would reject cross-jurisdictional class action tolling in 
Quinn, thereby rendering their claims untimely in Louisiana 
courts.  While parties should be prevented from “burdening 
courts with claims already litigated,” we must be “mindful of 
                                                 
144 Id. at 1238 (quoting Billiot v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 
640 So. 2d 826, 829 (La. Ct. App. 1994)).   
145 Id. 
146 Simmons, 55 So. 3d at 794. 
147 18A Federal Practice and Procedure:  
Jurisdiction § 4441, supra note 87, at 231. 
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not barring plaintiffs from having their day in court by 
overzealously preventing them from having two days in 
court.”148  We think a Louisiana court would reach the same 
conclusion.149  
 The defendants’ contrary arguments are not 
persuasive.  While the defendants recognize that, under 
Semtek, Louisiana law controls our res judicata analysis, they 
contend that Louisiana has adopted, as a principle of its own 
substantive law, the view that federal rules of claim 
preclusion dictate the effects of judgments entered by federal 
diversity courts.  On this account, neither Louisiana’s res 
judicata statute nor its equitable exception should inform our 
analysis.  In support of this proposition, the defendants rely 
on a single unpublished opinion of the Fifth Circuit.150   
                                                 
148 Rick v. Wyeth, No. 08-cv-1287 (ADM), 2010 WL 
3894063, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 23, 2010), aff’d, 662 F.3d 
1067 (8th Cir. 2011). 
149 The commentary to the relevant Louisiana statute 
explains that exceptions to claim preclusion ought not apply 
“where the plaintiff has simply failed to assert a right or 
claim . . . through oversight or lack of proper preparation.”  
1990 cmt. to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4232.  For the reasons 
explained above, we do not think this is such a case. 
150 Frank C. Minvielle LLC v. Atl. Ref. Co., 337 F. App’x 
429, 434 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Louisiana courts have repeatedly 
confirmed that federal law is applicable to consideration of 
whether a federal court judgment has res judicata effect.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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 The defendants are wrong.  It is true that, before 
Semtek, Louisiana courts stated that the claim-preclusive 
effect of all federal judgments was controlled by federal 
principles of claim preclusion.151  Some Louisiana courts 
have said the same thing after Semtek, but only in cases 
involving federal question jurisdiction.152  The defendants do 
not point to a single case in which a Louisiana court has 
chosen to ignore Semtek outright by looking to federal law, 
rather than state law, to assess the claim-preclusive effects of 
a judgment issued by a federal district court sitting in 
diversity.   
 To the contrary, federal district courts in Louisiana 
“appl[y] Louisiana law to determine the preclusive effect of 
                                                 
151 See, e.g., Pilie & Pilie v. Metz, 547 So. 2d 1305, 1309 
(La. 1989) (“[F]ederal law must be applied in determining the 
basic res judicata effects of the diversity judgment in the 
present case.”). 
152 See, e.g., Green v. Iberia Par. Sch. Bd., 945 So. 2d 940, 
943 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“[F]ederal law is applicable to 
consideration of whether a federal court judgment has res 
judicata effect.”) (considering effect of a judgment entered by 
a federal court exercising both its federal question jurisdiction 
and supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims). 
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[their] prior [diversity] judgments.”153  The defendants’ 
contrary argument—that Semtek tells us to look to Louisiana 
law, which then tells us to look back to federal law—is the 
jurisprudential equivalent of holding two mirrors up to one 
another, and we are comfortable rejecting it. 
 Next, the defendants rely on another Fifth Circuit case, 
Steve D. Thompson Trucking, Inc. v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc.,154 
to argue that the plaintiffs’ Delaware suits are barred by res 
judicata.155  That case involved parallel actions pending in 
                                                 
153 Commercializadora Portimex, S.A. de CV v. Zen-Noh 
Grain Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 645, 650 (E.D. La. 2005) 
(applying Semtek).  Another unpublished opinion of the Fifth 
Circuit suggests that Louisiana district courts are applying 
Semtek correctly.  See Tigert v. Am. Airlines Inc., 390 
F. App’x 357, 362 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Semtek for the 
proposition that Louisiana law controls the preclusive effect 
of a diversity judgment entered by a federal district court 
sitting in Louisiana). 
154 870 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1989).  
155 In fact, the defendants fail to cite a different case, 
Austin v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 31 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1994), 
that arguably helps them more.  The plaintiffs there brought a 
diversity suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana, lost on 
timeliness grounds, and then brought a second diversity suit 
in the District of Minnesota.  The Minnesota District Court 
applied Louisiana law to conclude that the first dismissal was 
claim-preclusive and dismissed the case.  The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed.   
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federal district courts in Louisiana and Mississippi.  The 
Louisiana District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as 
time-barred under the applicable Louisiana statute of 
limitations.  The defendants then moved to dismiss the 
Mississippi action as res judicata.  The Mississippi District 
Court denied the motion, but the Fifth Circuit reversed.  In its 
view, “[a]llowing plaintiffs who fail to comply with 
applicable statutes of limitations to move to the next state 
over would have the undesirable effect of encouraging forum 
shopping and rewarding dilatory conduct.”156   
While we appreciate that there are certain parallels 
between Thompson Trucking and the situation we confront 
today, we do not think Thompson Trucking is persuasive in 
the present context.   
 First, Thompson Trucking predated Semtek, leaving the 
Fifth Circuit free to reason that “the effect of a prior federal 
diversity judgment is controlled by federal rather than state 
                                                                                                             
 
Importantly, the District Court in Austin said that the 
plaintiff had “pointed to nothing in . . . Louisiana law 
suggesting that a judgment that would be considered final and 
on the merits in the context of a second action brought in the 
same jurisdiction would not be considered to be final and on 
the merits in the context of a[n] action brought in another 
jurisdiction.”  Austin v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., No. 4-92-cv-
1059 (HHM), 1994 WL 409473, at *4 (D. Minn. May 17, 
1994).  Here, cases applying Louisiana’s equitable exception 
to res judicata indicate precisely that. 
156 Thompson Trucking, 870 F.2d at 1046. 
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res judicata rules.”157  Under Semtek, that is no longer correct.  
As Wright and Miller point out in their discussion of the case, 
the Fifth Circuit “applied federal preclusion principles 
without asking whether either Louisiana or Mississippi law 
would preclude a second action in Mississippi.”158   
 Second, Thompson Trucking focused extensively on 
what it characterized as the plaintiffs’ impermissible forum 
shopping.  While we understand these concerns—and indeed 
might find them persuasive in the appropriate case—they 
carry little weight here for the straightforward reason that the 
plaintiffs have not engaged in what we consider to be forum 
shopping.  As we explained earlier, the plaintiffs were not 
scouring multiple jurisdictions for more advantageous 
substantive law or more sympathetic fact-finders.  Instead, 
they were trying to find one court—and only one court—
willing to reach the merits of their claims. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that Louisiana’s statutorily-
codified equitable exception to res judicata applies to the 
present facts.  Consistent with Semtek, we therefore hold that 
the timeliness dismissals entered by the Louisiana District 
Court do not create a res judicata bar to the plaintiffs’ 
Delaware suits.  Rather than affirm the Delaware District 
Court’s dismissals on this alternative ground, we will remand 
these cases for further proceedings.  
                                                 
157 Id. at 1045.   
158 18A Federal Practice & Procedure:  Jurisdiction § 4441 
n.27, supra note 87, at 232. 
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V. Issues on Remand  
 Among the issues the Delaware District Court will 
address on remand is the question of whether the plaintiffs’ 
claims are timely under Delaware’s applicable statute of 
limitations.159  The Delaware District Court recently 
addressed that issue in a related case, Marquinez v. Dole 
Food Co.160  While Marquinez acknowledged that Delaware 
accepts cross-jurisdictional class action tolling,161 it 
nonetheless concluded that any such tolling ended in 1995.  
Marquinez therefore held that Delaware’s two-year statute of 
limitation had long since expired.162     
 In reaching that conclusion, Marquinez relied on an 
extremely fine-grained interpretation of what occurred in 
Texas in 1995.  In particular, Marquinez drew a distinction 
between the question of whether the Texas District Court’s 
1995 dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds restarted 
Delaware’s statute of limitations clock, and whether the 
contemporaneous denial of the pending motion for class 
certification as moot did so.163  It is true, Marquinez noted, 
                                                 
159 Judges Fisher, Chagares and Vanaskie would prefer to 
leave any consideration of the proper application of the 
Delaware statute of limitations to the Delaware District Court 
on remand in the first instance. 
160 45 F. Supp. 3d 420 (D. Del. 2014). 
161 Id. at 422 (citing the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision 
in Blanco, 67 A.3d at 394). 
162 Id. at 423. 
163 Id. (citing Chaverri, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 568). 
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that the Delaware Superior Court’s Blanco decision addressed 
the first question, and in fact concluded that the Texas District 
Court’s “original decision to dismiss did not start plaintiff’s 
Delaware statute of limitations.”164  But, said Marquinez, the 
Delaware Superior Court “did not reach the [other] question, 
which forms an alternative basis to end tolling.”165   
 Contrary to Marquinez’s characterization, Blanco in 
fact summarized the defendants’ argument that the 
“plaintiff[s] cannot rely on the [Texas] actions to toll the 
statute of limitations because all pending motions, including 
one for class certification, were denied as moot.”166  In 
denying the defendants’ motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, the Blanco Court appears to have rejected that 
assertion.  Indeed, Blanco went further still, stating that the 
“defendants have attempted to tranquilize these claims 
through repeated forum shopping removals and technical 
dismissals, playing for time and delay and striving to prevent, 
or arguably frustrate, the claims from ever being heard on the 
merits in any court.”167   
 We also note that when the Texas District Court 
dismissed the class action in 1995, it did more than include a 
return clause in its dismissal order.168  It also entered 
                                                 
164 Blanco, 2012 WL 3194412, at *12 (emphasis added). 
165 Marquinez, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 423.  
166 Blanco, 2012 WL 3194412, at *5. 
167 Id. at *12. 
168 See supra note 11.   
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injunctions that barred the named plaintiffs and “[a]ll 
persons . . . who receive actual notice of this judgment” from 
commencing any related actions “in any court in the United 
States.”169   
 Both the return clause and the injunctions may be 
relevant under Delaware law.  For example, in Mergenthaler 
v. Asbestos Corporation of America,170 the Delaware Superior 
Court held that that “a court-imposed stay will result in a 
tolling of the statute of limitations where it prevents a 
plaintiff from discovering the identity of an otherwise 
unknowable defendant.”171  In support of that proposition, 
                                                 
169 Final Judgment at 2, Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., No. 94-cv-
1337, ECF No. 393 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 1995).  The full 
sentence from the Texas District Court’s judgment stated:  
“All persons in active concert or participation with plaintiffs 
and intervenors who receive actual notice of this judgment by 
personal service or otherwise, including, but not limited to, 
the attorneys who have appeared in these actions and their 
law firms, as well the officers, agents, servants, and 
employees of any of these persons, are PERMANENTLY 
ENJOINED from commencing or causing to be commenced 
any action involving a DBCP-related claim in any court in the 
United States, and from filing an intervention in Rodriguez, 
Erazo, or any other pending action in a court in the United 
States, on behalf of any plaintiff or intervenor plaintiff in 
Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez, and Isae Carcacmo.”  Id. 
at 2–3. 
170 500 A.2d 1357 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985). 
171 Id. at 1365.   
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Mergenthaler cited Braun v. Sauerwein,172 where the 
Supreme Court stated that when a plaintiff “has been disabled 
to sue, by a superior power, without any default of his own . . 
. unless the statutes cease to run during the continuance of the 
supervening disability, he is deprived of a portion of the time 
within which the law contemplated he might sue.”173   
 Nor did Marquinez acknowledge that when the Texas 
District Court reinstated the class action in 2004, it framed its 
decision as “a direct continuation of the prior proceedings 
over which the court expressly stated its intent to retain 
jurisdiction.”174  Rather than look to these sources, Marquinez 
focused on cases from other jurisdictions that applied the state 
law of Louisiana and Hawaii, rather than the law of 
Delaware.175   
 We leave it to the Delaware District Court on remand 
to consider these issues and to perform its “duty . . . to 
ascertain from all the available data what the state law is and 
apply it rather than to prescribe a different rule, however 
superior it may appear from the viewpoint of ‘general 
law.’”176   
                                                 
172 77 U.S. 218 (1869). 
173 Id. at 222–23. 
174 Delgado, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 813. 
175 See Marquinez, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 423, 425 n.9. 
176 West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). 
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VI. Conclusion  
For over two decades, the plaintiffs have been 
knocking on courthouse doors all over the country and, 
indeed, the world, only for those doors to remain closed.  The 
Delaware District Court concluded that, pursuant to the first-
filed rule, its doors must remain shut as well.  
That conclusion was in error.  Neither the first-filed 
rule nor Louisiana’s doctrine of res judicata is fatal to the 
plaintiffs’ Delaware claims.  We revive this litigation now, 
more than two decades after it began, while expressing our 
sincerest hope that it proceeds with more alacrity than it has 
to the present date. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the Delaware District 
Court’s dismissals and remand these cases for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.   
